International Law\u27s Contribution to Security in the Post-Cold War Era: From Functional to Political and Beyond by Adler, Matthew H.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 19, Issue 5 1995 Article 9
International Law’s Contribution to Security in
the Post-Cold War Era: From Functional to
Political and Beyond
Matthew H. Adler∗
∗
Copyright c©1995 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
International Law’s Contribution to Security in
the Post-Cold War Era: From Functional to
Political and Beyond
Matthew H. Adler
Abstract
This Essay discusses the progress that has been made in the post-Cold War world to bring
international law’s contribution to political areas into line with its longstanding contribution to
functional ones. It uses three issues—human rights and the commission of war crimes; inter-
national trade; and the use of force by States—to show how international law has been used to
achieve concrete results and to highlight the challenges that remain.
INTERNATIONAL LAW'S CONTRIBUTION
TO SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA: FROM FUNCTIONAL TO
POLITICAL AND BEYOND
Matthew H. Adler*
INTRODUCTION
I took my first international law class as an undergraduate in
1979, at the last full blooming of the Cold War, just before the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. My notions of precisely what in-
ternational law was were not dissimilar from those of the stu-
dents I now interview; I had some idealistic idea that interna-
tional law would both prescribe a moral set of rules for the
World to abide by, and, not incidentally, let me travel often. I
was half right (on the travel side). I remember my youthful
hopes being quashed by my professor's accurate but cold-
blooded delineation of two poles of international law, which he
called "functional" and "political." The functional bodies were
those like the international postal service, and weights and meas-
ures; there, he said, international law worked well, as it did not
conflict with notions of sovereignty, ideology, and power. The
further one got from the functional side of the continuum, how-
ever, the less effective was international law; thus, rules on sub-
jects such as human rights and self-defense were harder to both
promulgate and enforce.
Later, I was to witness this first hand. In my first job, I was
the junior member of a team of Washington lawyers who were
seeking over US$1 billion from the Islamic Republic of Iran.1
My particular issue was lost profits: whether, having been kicked
out of Iran in 1979, the big oil companies could claim not only
the value of the hard assets that they lost but also the value of
their concessions on a going-forward basis. To my clients, this
* B.S., Cornell, 1980, J.D., Columbia, 1983. The Author is a partner in the Phila-
delphia office of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz specializing in arbitration and transna-
tional litigation. Mr. Adler is a member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law and Vice-Chair of the American Bar Association's Section
of International Law, Subcommittee on Private International Law. The opinions herein
are solely those of the Author.
1. Amoco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1320 (1988).
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was nothing less than their contractual right to recoup the full
value of their investment, since without the promise of those fu-
ture profits they would not have made the investment in the first
place. To Iran, this was a matter of national sovereignty: the
idea that a country could at any time assert title to its own re-
sources was at the heart of the self-determination and anti-
colonialism strain that had influenced international law since
World War II. Reams have been written on this issue and I will
not even attempt to do it justice here; I remember, though, as I
toiled on the brief and seethed at what I thought then was the
overly political nature of Iran's briefs, hearing my undergradu-
ate professor's voice as he spoke about the functional-political
continuum. Iran was more than able to cite Third World com-
mentary on what by then was a significant North/South issue,
and it readily became apparent that whoever prevailed under
"international law," there was a dramatic absence of consensus.
In my next job, as a lawyer with the U.S. Department of
State, I had the opportunity to negotiate a property claims treaty
with East Germany ("GDR"), back when there was such a coun-
try as East Germany. Now, it should hardly come as a surprise to
anyone that political considerations impinged on this process,
but what I was unprepared for was the extent to which the Cold
War reared its head. After all, I remember thinking, the biggest
policy decision - whether the GDR would pay U.S. citizens
whose property had been expropriated - had been made al-
ready, in the affirmative, when the East Germans gave the green
light to the negotiations. That decision taken, I thought that it
was my task to craft workable rules for reimbursement. To my
surprise, I found the drafting next to impossible, because we
could never refer to property "taken" by an entity which the
United States barely recognized. As to how we dealt with prop-
erty taken in Berlin, a city stratified by the Cold War into quad-
rants - well, let us just say that the Berlin Wall collapsed in
time.
In the seventeen years since my college survey course, the
decade since I fought with Iran, and the seven years since my
time in Foggy Bottom, great progress has been made to bring
international law's contribution to political areas into line with
its longstanding contribution to functional ones. Thus, to an-
swer the question posed by this Essay, not only can international
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law "truly effect global political and economic stability," but it is
doing so more every day.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE COLD WAR ERA
The achilles heel of international law has long been its lack
of an executive body. Absent the ability to enforce international
edicts, international law depends upon virtually unanimous con-
sensus or, in the case of the Gulf War, overwhelming firepower
to be effective. For the considerable post-World War II period,
consensus on most meaningful matters was precluded by the ide-
ological and economic divisions that clove the World. This led
to every international legal principle of any consequence being
filtered through the prism of the Cold War.
Take, for example, nuclear non-proliferation. On paper, it
is a testament to what international law can achieve. The Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty2 ("NPT") is signed by over one
hundred countries, including some but not all of the countries
most suspected of harboring ambitions to be nuclear weapons
states. It represents a consensus on a difficult political issue: at
bottom, non-nuclear weapons states trade off their ambitions to
obtain nuclear weapons for promises of nuclear power assistance
from the nuclear weapons states. In practice, however, matters
have not worked as smoothly. Specifically, to again recall the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in what would prove to be the last
gasp not only of Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev but of the
empire he represented, the United States decided that it could
not have both a strong non-proliferation policy and a bulwark
against the Soviet Union in South Asia. The United States thus
chose to look the other way at both India's "peaceful nuclear
explosion"4 and Pakistan's increasingly bold and transparent
moves to acquire the bomb.5 The administrations in power dur-
ing this period, both Democrat and Republican, annually ob-
tained the requisite waivers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
2. Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
3. Alessandra Stanley, Russia's New Leaders Govern, And Live, in Neo-Soviet Style, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1995, at Al (describing Brezhnev as Soviet leader).
4. John F. Bums, India Denies Atom-Test Plan But Then Turns Ambiguous, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1995, at A4 (describing India's secret nuclear weapons program).
5. Id. (discussing Pakistan's secret nuclear weapons program).
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Act6 ("NNPA") so that they could continue to supply foreign
assistance to states that were then judged vital to U.S. interests,
bomb or no bomb. International law thus took a decided back
seat to national security.
II. DE-POLITICIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA
With the end of the Cold War, the opportunity for this kind
of interference with international legal principles has dimin-
ished. Will political considerations continue to impede legal
ones, so that not all international legal edicts get carried out? Of
course they will; there will always be issues that are simply too
difficult for resolution by consensus. The Cold War, however,
was a particularly nasty and prolonged political fight, and with it
over, there is the opportunity for international law to take giant
steps and make the same contribution to establishing norms in
traditionally political areas as it has in traditionally functional
ones.
Three examples of recent "political" issues come to mind:
human rights and the commission of war crimes; international
trade; and the use of force by States. In all three, the ability of
international law over the past six years to achieve concrete re-
sults has been as astonishing as it has been heartwarming; in all
three, that progress has been much greater than it would have
been during the Cold War; and in all three, lest we break our
arms patting ourselves on the collective international back,
much remains to be done.
A. The Development of Human Rights Law: War Crimes
In the immediate post-World War II era, before the Cold
War gathered steam, the law of war crimes represented a major
development in international law. Telord Taylor's recent book
on the Nuremberg trials7 demonstrates how legal was the search
for a basis upon which to charge the Nazis; while everyone had
an instinctual feeling that these men were guilty of terrible
wrongs, the exact nature of those wrongs and the jurisdictional
basis for prosecuting those wrongs were questions with which the
6. 22 U.S.C. § 3201 et seq (1994).
7. T. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
(1992).
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Allied lawyers struggled mightily. The resulting indictments,
and the subsequent convictions based on those indictments, rep-
resented a giant leap forward for international law. From that
point forward, there was a basis, set forth in clear rules and sup-
ported by dramatic precedent, for outlawing war crimes.
That development almost died stillborn, however. When I
think of war crimes trials, I think not of the Nuremberg trials but
of their immediate aftermath. The Nazis in the dock at Nurem-
berg, however heinous they were, did not personally kill a single
Jew. Their underlings, indicted and tried later, had that blood
directly on their hands. But with few exceptions, most of those
underlings served little or no time in prison. By the time those
secondary trials began the Cold War had begun in earnest and
the United States and the Soviet Union were vying for the hearts
and minds of the vanquished Germany. More war crimes trials,
and stiff sentences, had no place in that equation. Thus, early in
the war crimes era, international law was outshone by the Cold
War, and the development of international law on this subject
ceased.
The men shortly to be tried in The Hague for war crimes in
the former Yugoslavia will have no such ideological cover.' Rus-
sia may be sympathetic to the Serbs, but not to the point of de-
manding that the trials not take place. For the first time in fifty
years, there will be a war crimes trial that will take the ideas first
advanced in Nuremberg - that some forms of behavior have no
place in civilized society no matter the circumstances - and de-
velop them for the next century. Whether one's goal is punish-
ment, deterrence, or simply codification of international law on
this subject - and a compelling case can be made for any or all
of the above - this is a substantial advancement of international
law. It is also one that, obviously, could not have occurred were
Yugoslavia or Serbia still in what we used to call the "Eastern
Bloc."
B. The Development of International Trade Law
International trade is at once the issue on which the most
and least progress has been made since the end of the Cold War.
This progress has been due in part to a development almost as
8. Philip Shenon, GI. 's to Provide Security for War Crimes Investigators in Bosnia, N.Y.
TIMES, April 1, 1996, at A6 (detailing War Crimes Tribunal's activities).
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striking as the end of the Cold War: the toning down of North/
South rhetoric. This has not occurred, to be sure, because in-
come differentials have narrowed; to the contrary, the gap be-
tween the haves and have-nots continues to widen. Rather, this
progress, described briefly below, has occurred because the so-
cialistic ideology professed by many Third World nations in the
1970's and 1980's has been adjudged out of style. Whether this
is because it did not work, because the Soviet Union is no longer
sponsoring these states, or because the United States is the only
remaining superpower is beside the point; the impact of this ton-
ing down is that North and South now seem to apply a shared set
of economic values to international agreements.
Consequently, international trade agreements now reflect
an essentially capitalist trade and development model. Protec-
tionism and state-sponsored industry are disfavored while bor-
ders are thrown open to investment, with the clear view that an
entity will not invest dollars unless it can obtain an ownership
stake and earn profits. One sees this in the North American
Free Trade Agreement9 ("NAFTA"), in which one party, Mexico,
recently had a strong state-owned sector; in the various other re-
gional free trade pacts that have followed in NAFTA's wake; and,
of course, in the finalization in 1995 of the Uruguay Round of
GATT,1  and the corresponding establishment of the World
Trade Organization11 ("WTO") to enforce that agreement. It is
unlikely that the majority of the World's nations would have
agreed to a trade police force such as the WTO if they had not
first acieved some fundamental consensus in recent years on
trade philosophy and rules.
Make no mistake, the WTO can impose penalties which will
hurt. It will be a novel experience for many countries hit with
these penalties, and we may see the "brave new world" of inter-
national trade sorely tested in its early years. But the fact re-
mains that the rules, and the enforcement mechanism, are now
9. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat 2057 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994) [hereinafter NAFTA Im-
plementation Act].
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Fi-
nal Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, April 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
11. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Or-
ganization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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far more visible and powerful than in years past. This is a sub-
stantial - and, to use my old professor's typology, political -
step forward for international law. Anybody who thinks that in-
ternational trade is functional and not political, that it consists
mainly of dusty old customs regulations and tariff schedules, has
never tried to tell France or Japan that they must open up their
agricultural systems to imports, or Mexico that it must reform its
labor laws, or the United States that it cannot continue to pro-
tect antiquated heavy industry or the textile industry. Trade laws
cut at the heart of a country's economic vision for itself, and for
nations to now cede authority over much of this heart is the
clearest recognition of all that we are in a new era.
C. A Program For Continued Development
More dramatic, but not more important, 12 are the emerging
rules on use of force. We have seen, since the Cold War ended,
U.S. troops committed to the Persian Gulf, to Somalia, and now
to Bosnia. I would be surprised if most of my peers do not use
the Gulf War as a model for future collective security.
Admittedly, none of the three deployments would or could
have taken place in the Cold War. A Western assault on the
flashpoints of the Middle East or Central Europe would have
been viewed as a preliminary to World War III, not as a precur-
sor of a "new world order." And, to the extent that they save life
and advance fundamental principles, such as you cannot nakedly
grab your neighbor's land or send him to "ethnic cleansing"
camps, they are to be applauded as courageous steps.
That said, however, the rules on use of force have a long way
to go before we can argue that they proceed from as strong an
international legal consensus as the GATT or even war crimes. If
force is appropriate in Bosnia in 1996, why was it not appropri-
ate in 1994? If ethnic slaughter brought troops to Europe, why
not to Rwanda? If Kuwait's leading export had been fruit and
not oil, would we have shown the same misty-eyed reverence for
the integrity of its borders?
The point is not to sneer at any of the international military
interventions to which the United States has contributed troops,
12. I say not more important, by the way, because while almost every U.S. citizen
can identify the Gulf War and probably no more than one percent can identify the
WTO, it is the latter that will have a much greater impact in the years ahead.
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money, and lives. They have each either advanced, or promise
to advance, the rule of law. What cannot be denied, however, is
the selectivity involved in these commitments. Given that one
purpose of any system of law, including international law, is to
establish a system of rules and expectations for a variety of situa-
tions, selectivity runs counter to an established international law
on the use of force. As long as we continue to approach this
subject on an ad hoc basis, deciding that this land grab is accept-
able but that one is not, this massacre worthy of bombing but
that one is not, we run the risk of these worthy and laudable
exercises being viewed with cynicism and considered of suspect
international legal merit. We also run the risk that future tyrants
will not take sufficient warning, because the lines of world inter-
vention are not drawn with sufficient clarity.
CONCLUSION
Six years, however, is a very short time for so much progress,
and it has barely been that long since crowds danced on the Ber-
lin Wall. For this much to have been accomplished in recon-
structing a genuine international legal regime, on so many polit-
ical subjects, is the most hopeful of beginnings. The challenge is
to build on this process by both successfully administering the
initiatives taken to date and by continuing to construct rational
rules of legal engagement on economic, military, and human
rights fronts.
